The Impact of Maritime Power on History: 1660~1783

Author: Mahan
Publisher:
Publication Date: 2006-01-01
Features: The purpose of writing this book is very clear, which is to seriously study the general history of Europe and America, and to study the impact of naval power on the historical development of Europe and America. Generally speaking, historians know very little about maritime conditions. Sometimes they have neither a special interest in the sea nor professional knowledge in this regard; therefore, they often overlook the profound impact of naval power on major events. Sometimes they have a relatively good understanding of the overall trend of the development of naval power, but they do not have a deep understanding of the role of naval power in specific situations. Generally speaking, it is relatively easy to say that the use and control of the sea, whether now or in the past, have become an important factor in the development of world history; however, it is relatively difficult to identify and explain the exact meaning of naval power in a specific situation. However, unless we achieve this, simply acknowledging the importance of naval power in a general and vague manner will still remain vague and unrealistic; because this recognition is not, as it should be, dependent on collecting some special examples, and through the analysis of the specific period in which these special examples are located, to clearly explain the exact role of naval power. We can take the example of two British writers who belittle the impact of naval power on major events. These two examples seem hard to understand, because compared to other countries, the strength of Britain owes more to the sea. One British writer Arnold wrote in his book "History of Rome": "There have been two times in history when unique geniuses have struggled against the resources and organizational institutions of a great country. But every time, the great country won. Once it was Hannibal① who struggled against Rome for 17 years; the other was Napoleon who struggled against Britain for 16 years. Hannibal's struggle ended at Zama; Napoleon's struggle ended at Waterloo." Another British writer, Sir Edward Creasy, when quoting the book "History of Rome," added: "But almost no sufficient and detailed research has been conducted on the similarities between the two struggles. This is the Roman general Scipio② who finally defeated the powerful Carthage, and the British general Wellington who completely overthrew the French emperor. They were both senior and important commanders for many years, but they were both far away from the main battlefield. The most important part of their military careers was spent in the same country - Spain. Precisely in Spain, Scipio, like Wellington, continuously encountered and defeated almost all the secondary generals of the enemy before opposing the main fighter and the conqueror himself. Scipio and Wellington both restored the confidence of their compatriots in the war after a series of defeats, and each of them only ended a long and dangerous war after completely and thoroughly defeating the selected enemy commander and the selected experienced enemy army." The above two British writers did not mention the even more astonishing coincidence that in these two wars, the victors all controlled the sea. The Romans controlled the sea routes, forcing Hannibal to march through Gaul③ for that long and dangerous journey. During the march, more than half of the old soldiers became weak, which enabled the great Scipio, who was sent from the Rh?ne to Spain, to intercept Hannibal's supply lines, return home, and deal with the invaders at Trebia. Throughout the war, the Roman legions moved back and forth between Hannibal's base in Spain and Italy along the sea routes without interruption, full of vigor. In the decisive battle of the Metaurus River, compared to the army of Hasdrubal and Hannibal, the Roman army was in a positional advantage, which should have been the key to deciding the outcome of the battle. However, because Hasdrubal, the younger brother of Hannibal, could not transport reinforcements by sea but had to send them by land through Gaul, the Roman army finally won this battle. After that, at the decisive moment of the war, the two armies of Carthage were separated in the long Italy, and one of them was destroyed by the joint actions of two Roman generals. On the other hand, naval historians rarely consider the connection between general history and the specific subject they study, the history of the navy. They usually limit themselves to simply compiling the chronology of naval events. Compared to the British, the French are not like this; the talented and educated French can seriously investigate the reasons for the extraordinary results, and investigate the interrelationships between various events. However, as far as I know, no book has ever taught the specific subject we are discussing here, that is, to evaluate the impact of naval power on historical development and the prosperity and vitality of a country. As for some other histories that discuss the war, politics, society, and economic conditions of various countries, they only occasionally and generally mention some maritime events. The purpose of this book is to put maritime interests in a prominent position, but not to separate them from the causal surrounding environment in the overall history, and to try to explain how the surrounding environment affects maritime interests, and how maritime interests change the surrounding environment. The historical period covered in this book begins with the unique sailing ship era in 1660 and ends with the end of the American Revolutionary War in 1783. Although the continuity of the general history based on a series of maritime events in this book is not very obvious, this book has tried its best to provide an accurate and clear outline. As a naval officer who loves his job, I was not hesitant or restrained when writing this book, and I discussed naval policy, naval strategy, and naval tactics; I avoided using naval technical terms as much as possible, hoping that the simple issues raised in this book will attract the interest of non-professional readers. A·T Mahan December 1889