Strategic Conflict

Author: (American) Schelling and Zhao Hua
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-01-01
Features: A groundbreaking masterpiece by Thomas Schelling, the 2005 Nobel laureate in Economics! "Why can some nations, groups, and individuals resolve conflicts peacefully, while others are constantly plagued by conflict? Thanks to Schelling and Omand's research, this age-old question that hased us has been illuminated." – Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Nobel Committee in Economics "The original contributions of masters in economics are often highly technical papers, making them inaccessible to general readers. Fortunately, Schelling's original contributions are an exception. His The Strategy of Conflict involves minimal technical terms and mathematical models, relying entirely on the power of logic to demonstrate the depth and breadth of his ideas. It is undoubtedly the best example of how game theory can help people understand the real world." – Zhou Lian'an, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University "Professor Schelling's book The Strategy of Conflict rationally analyzes an important branch of political science, namely the contemporary international deterrence politics. The book is written in clear and engaging language. In this field, the author's contribution surpasses all previous scholars. Among the numerous works on international deterrence politics, The Strategy of Conflict is undoubtedly the best, most persuasive, and most brilliant book to date." – Annual Review of the American Academy of Sciences This book is The Strategy of Conflict, published by Harvard University Press in 1960. In the press release announcing the award from the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, it was specifically mentioned. There is no doubt that The Strategy of Conflict is the most important reason for Schelling's Nobel Prize. The most important idea developed in The Strategy of Conflict is the crucial role of credible commitments in conflict or negotiation processes. This idea originated from his paper "On Negotiation" (published in The American Economic Review in 1956 and later included in this book as Chapter 2). The basic concept is that in negotiation and conflict situations, if one party can restrict their own choice freedom in a credible and observable way, it can actually enhance their negotiating position. Conversely, granting one party more discretionary decision-making power may harm the interests of that participant.