Research on the Institutional Economics of Chinese Drug Regulation

Author: Ma Leixin
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-12-01
Features: Preface Content Summary Abstract
1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
1.2 Literature Review on Drug Regulation
1.3 Logical Framework and Research Methods
1.4 Content Arrangement
2 The Formation of Government Regulation: Theoretical Analysis of Regulation Nature
2.1 Explanation of the Concept of Regulation
2.2 Information Asymmetry Theory and Government Regulation
2.2.1 Information Asymmetry and Its Universality
2.2.2 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
2.2.3 Market Mechanism and Information Asymmetry
2.2.4 Information Asymmetry and Government Regulation
2.3 Externalities Theory and Government Regulation
2.4 Market Power and Government Regulation
2.5 Efficient Supply of Public Goods and Government Regulation
2.6 Efficient Supply of Non-Valuable Goods and Government Regulation
2.7 Deregulation and Regulation Strengthening: On the Nature of Regulation
2.7.1 Deregulation
2.7.2 Regulation Strengthening
2.8 Summary
3 The Origin and Specificity of Drug Regulation
3.1 The Duality of Drugs and the Specificity of the Pharmaceutical Industry
3.1.1 The Duality of Drugs
3.1.2 The Specificity of the Pharmaceutical Industry
3.2 Analysis of the Origin of Drug Regulation
3.2.1 Improving Public Health Welfare
3.2.2 Optimizing Medical and Pharmaceutical Resource Allocation
3.2.3 Correcting Market Failures in Drug Markets
3.2.4 Reducing Transaction Costs
3.3 The Specificity and Differences of Drug Regulation
3.3.1 The Nature of Drug Regulation
3.3.2 The Dual Objectives of Drug Regulation
3.3.3 The Overlapping Nature of Drug Regulatory Agencies
3.3.4 The Dispersion of Drug Regulatory Targets
3.4 Government, Market, and Drug Regulation
3.4.1 Government, Market, and Drug Regulation: Scope and Boundaries
3.4.2 Government and Drug Regulation
3.4.3 Market and Drug Regulation