Transcendence of the Self: A Phenomenological Exploration

Author: (French) Sartre
Publisher:
Publication Date: 2002-01-01
Features: The Transcendence of the Ego is Sartre's earliest work. The only two works published before this cannot strictly be considered philosophical studies. The first is an article on Duguit's legal theory of social reality published in 1927, and the second is The Myth of Truth, published in the Bullhorn magazine in 1931, where Sartre expresses his thoughts in the form of a fable. With this work, Sartre begins his exploration toward Being and Nothingness. Additionally, Sartre's life chronicles confirm that it aligns with his philosophical concerns at the time. It can be said that all of Sartre's writings at that time, whether simultaneous or not, were at least conceived simultaneously. The Transcendence of the Ego was written in 1934, with part of it being composed by Sartre in Berlin while studying Husserl's phenomenology. Between 1935, he also wrote Imagination and The Imaginary (published in 1936 and 1940, respectively). Later, between 1937 and 1938, he completed Psychology, which he had been conceptualizing since 1934. Later, he separated another work, Preliminary Exposé of the Phenomenology of Emotion, which was published in 1939. Finally, to mention the subsequent Being and Nothingness, published in 1943. In Being and Nothingness, he upholds the conclusions of The Transcendence of the Ego, while also refining and deepening the critique of solipsism that it lacked. Regarding this youthful work, Sartre only negated one point, which was barely elaborated in the text: the engagement with psychoanalytic content. He conducted a thorough reckoning with past ideas—i.e., negating the concepts of unconsciousness and understanding in psychoanalysis and no longer adhering to past prejudices in this field. However, the theory of consciousness structure itself, as well as the fundamental notion of the ego as a transcendence over psychological objects, remained unchanged. Simone de Beauvoir made a clear comment on this, though it is somewhat brief, and it is worth mentioning here. She said, "The Transcendence of the Ego describes the relationship between 'I' and consciousness from the perspective of Husserl—but in opposition to Husserl's later theories. Between consciousness and the psychological, Sartre maintains the distinction he has always upheld. When consciousness is direct and present to the self, the psychological is the totality of objects, which can only be grasped through reflective activity, much like perceptual objects that only reveal themselves through profiles (profils): for example, hatred is a transcendental object, and we grasp its existence through experience (Erlebnis), which is probable. My 'self' is itself an existence in the world, and so is the 'self' of others. Therefore, Sartre establishes his oldest and most persistent belief: that there is an autonomy of non-reflective consciousness. The relationship with the self as described by La Rochefoucauld and the French psychological tradition would corrupt our spontaneous movements, and it only appears in certain special circumstances. What is more important for Sartre is: this psychological self, which makes itself 'I' for others and in the same way as objects, is detached from solipsism. Eliminating solipsism allows one to avoid idealism, and Sartre maintains the practical contribution (moral and political) of his argument in the structure." Most philosophers consider the "self" to be the "monk" of consciousness. Some philosophers recognize the formal presence of the "self" within "existence" as a unified empty principle. Others—mostly psychologists—seek to discover the material presence of the "self" as the center of desire and action in every moment of our psychological life. Here, I want to point out that the "self" is neither formally nor materially present in consciousness: it is in the world, external; it is an existence in the world, just like the "self" of others.