Research on Group Loans under Asymmetric Information

Author: Zhang Yuan
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-09-01
Features: Poverty alleviation work has long been a challenge for researchers and policymakers due to its complexity and difficulty. The attitude of financial institutions and the inefficiency of non-profit organizations have hindered effective poverty alleviation efforts worldwide. However, group lending has stood out, demonstrating exceptional performance in practice in achieving social goals. Therefore, exploring and researching the role and impact of group lending in poverty alleviation from both theoretical and practical perspectives holds significant practical implications. This book begins by addressing the question, "Why can group lending achieve widespread success globally?" It investigates and explains the following unique phenomena: most institutions offering group lending have achieved high repayment rates, high interest rate policies have not led to the failure of group lending institutions but rather to their success, and the repayment rates of a few failed institutions show significant differences in both time and space.
Around these issues and phenomena, the book presents three core models: the "Adverse Selection" model, the "Moral Hazard" model, and the "Repayment Game" model. Additionally, by analyzing the actual conditions of rural poverty alleviation in China and through typical case studies, it identifies existing problems and offers many practical recommendations, making it valuable for financial institutions and policymaking departments to study and adopt. This book is part of the "Fudan University Young Economists Series."