Modern World System, Volume 1

Author: (American) Immanuel Wallerstein
Translator: Luo Rongqu and others
Publisher:
Publishing Date: 1998-09-01
Features: This book discusses the origins and development of the capitalist world economy, i.e., the modern world system. The modern world system originated in parts of Europe and gradually expanded to include other regions of the world until it covered the entire globe. The author argues that by the mid-21st century, the capitalist world system will be replaced by a subsequent system (one or more). We cannot predict what this new system will look like, but we can influence its outcome through our current political and moral actions. This book is highly regarded in Western academia and is a must-read reference for Western university students. It is not a general history of modern world history but a comprehensive macro-analysis that holistically explains the historical process of the world over the past five and a half centuries.
Excerpt: The differences between the Chinese Empire and Europe in the context of the world economy and empire are contrasted, and another factor must be considered to understand the relationship between the regional center or the vanguard of a system and its periphery. An empire has the responsibility to govern and protect its vast territory and population, which will deplete the attention, effort, and financial resources that could be invested in developing capitalism. For example, the Japanese pirates (Wokou) and their impact on China's expansion. Overall, the Wokou caused less trouble for China than the Turks did for Europe. However, when the Turks advanced eastward, no European emperor sought to cancel the Portuguese explorations. The Portuguese did not shift from overseas adventures to protecting Vienna because they had no political obligation to do so, no mechanism to incentivize such a shift, and no interest group in Europe that demanded it. Expansion seemed to benefit European emperors less directly than it did the Portuguese king. As discussed, the Chinese emperor may have noticed, and Chinese officials certainly did, that Zheng He's expeditions depleted the imperial treasury, while the need to expand national resources was one of the motivations for European expansion. An empire lacks the entrepreneurial vision of a nation within a world economy because it claims to encompass the entire world. It cannot enrich its economy by draining others, as it is the only economy (this is certainly a Chinese idea, possibly a Chinese belief). Of course, the emperor's share of the economic distribution could also be increased. But this would mean that the state is not seeking enterprise profits but rather increasing tribute. Moreover, if the central political power weakens, the very form of tribute could become economically self-defeating, as in this case, "tribute" might be a hidden form of trade that is detrimental to the empire. There is also a connection between military technology and the structure of an empire. Carlo Cipolla raised the question: Why did the Chinese see the Portuguese adopt military technological advantages while they did not. His explanation is: "The court, like it feared foreign enemies, feared domestic bandits, feared foreign invasion as much as internal unrest, and thus did its best to limit the spread of gunpowder knowledge and the diffusion of skilled artisans." In Europe, with its fragmented sovereign states, it was impossible to limit the spread of armaments. In China, it was clearly still possible. Therefore, the centralized system rejected technological progress, which was of great significance for maintaining its rule in the long run. The imperial form may have once again become a structural constraint, this time on technological development. There is one last puzzle. At this time, a form of individualism emerged in China, the Wang Yangming school, which William T. de Bary compared to Western humanism and called it "a near revolution" that failed to "fully develop." Is individualism, as an ideology, not a sign of the emerging bourgeoisie, not a force supporting it against traditional powers? According to Roland Mussetter, the opposite seems to be the case. After analyzing the social conflicts of the Ming Dynasty in China, he pointed out that individualism was a weapon of the Confucian bureaucracy, the bureaucratic class, which was "modernized" in its views and opposed the eunuchs who were both "entrepreneurs" and "feudal lords," representing the "nationalist" expansion of the Ming Dynasty. Mussetter's argument is as follows: "In the Ming Dynasty, a large number of educated people from the middle class voluntarily became eunuchs. Due to their education, they could exert overwhelming influence, and the empire was practically controlled by these eunuchs. Once they reached high positions, they promoted their family members, creating a group of followers through appointments and land grants, thus becoming powerful figures within the empire. From this perspective, the significant role played by eunuchs resembles a function of the bourgeoisie's rise. The imperial relatives and dignitaries attempted to create a following composed of middle-class, educated individuals whom they promoted among the civil servants to protect themselves (this latter group was sometimes a follower of Wang Yangming, who practiced his teachings and opposed the ruling eunuchs). Meanwhile, the eunuchs, who revered Zhu Xi as the guardian of orthodoxy and power (on the issue of power, the eunuchs were the first to align with him), were the ones who upheld orthodoxy and power. Since both the imperial relatives and the eunuchs as landowners had their power bases, these struggles became even more severe. The Ming rulers attempted to strengthen their position by establishing a feudal system composed of relatives and supporters, but the victims were the peasants. Meanwhile, the state's expenditures continued to increase." Of course, the same was true in Europe. But in Europe, these expenditures supported the emerging bourgeoisie and nobility, who later became bourgeoisie to save themselves, while the bourgeoisie, in turn, became nobility. In the Ming Dynasty of China, the ideology that ultimately served the Western bourgeoisie to seize power was used to oppose the bourgeoisie itself, which (due to its early acquisition of power?) played the role of defending orthodoxy and power. There are many questions left to explain, but this raises doubts about the simplistic view of linking individualistic thought too directly to the rise of capitalism. It certainly raises doubts about any causal relationship that treats the emergence of such thoughts as the main reason. The argument about China can be summarized as follows: There is skepticism about the significant differences between Europe and China in the 15th century in terms of population, area, technological conditions (agricultural technology and naval engineering), and other fundamental aspects. Moreover, the extent of certain existing differences is difficult to explain as the reason for such vast differences in development over the following centuries. Additionally, the differences in value systems seem to be exaggerated, and similarly, the extent of these differences is not sufficient to cause such different outcomes. Because, as we have tried to show, ideological systems can be used to serve opposing interests and can be associated with very different structures. Value positivists, eager to refute materialist arguments, made a mistake by emphasizing the correspondence between ideology and social structures (reversed causality) to an extent far beyond classical Marxism. The fundamental differences between China and Europe once again reflect the combination of a long-term trend and a more immediate economic cycle. The long-term trend can be traced back to the two great ancient empires of Rome and China, and the ways and degrees of their disintegration. When Rome left only a faint memory in the Middle Ages, its reality was largely coordinated by a common church; whereas China managed to maintain the political structure of the empire, though a weak one. This was the difference between feudalism and a world empire built on a salaried bureaucracy. As a result, China was able to maintain a more advanced economy in many respects than Europe. Over its more than a thousand years, the degree of exploitation of peasants was also likely lighter.