The End of Liberalism (Translation Series of Social Theory)

Author: (USA) Immanuel Wallerstein et al.
Translator: Hao Mingwei / Zhang Fan
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-04-01
Features: The fall of the Berlin Wall, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, led people to celebrate, believing that communism had died out and that Marxist ideology had waned. Undoubtedly, this action and this belief were correct. (Author's words) However, to celebrate these events as signifying the final victory of liberalism and to do the same would be wrong, completely misinterpreting the actual situation. On the contrary, these events even more clearly demonstrate the decline of liberalism and that we have finally entered a "post-liberal" world. This book specifically elaborates on this argument! Immanuel Wallerstein, a major representative of world-system theory. This book is a synthesis of three works by the main representative of world-system theory—Wallerstein: After Liberalism, Anti-System Movements, and Utopia—The Historical Choice of the 21st Century, concentrating on the views of this renowned world-system theorist. The book argues that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union do not mean that the ideology of liberalism has won; on the contrary, liberalism has become even more waning, with 1989 marking its end. The world has entered the "post-liberal" era. In the decades following liberalism, the world system will enter a "dark period." By examining the process of differentiation in the modern world system, the author analyzes potential future changes, proposes the historical choices we face, and envisions a path to rebuilding the world system on more rational and equitable social foundations. Based on an analysis of resistance movements since the rise of capitalism, the book clarifies the historical achievements and limitations of anti-system movements. It also provides a detailed and thought-provoking analysis of the various political trends and social phenomena worldwide from 1789 to 1989 and the 1990s, as well as an outlook on the development of human society in the 21st century. The book is rich in content and convincing in its insights, offering clear and concise analysis. It is particularly suitable for researchers and enthusiasts in philosophy, world history, international politics, international relations, and sociology.
Excerpt: I have long been drawing attention to the ideological shield constructed by the ruling forces to counter the "dangerous classes." I have said that this shield is the ideology of liberalism, which operates directly or indirectly through a less radical socialism (or progressivism), trading limited benefits for the substance of opposition to the current world system. I have also said that the 1968 world revolution severely damaged this ideological shield, ultimately leading to the demise of various forms of communism in 1989. Yet, how did this ideological shield, which had been successfully operating for 150 years, suddenly fail? It is difficult to answer this question without a thoughtful examination of the superficiality of ideological claims, without considering the lack of reflection among the oppressed. From the outset, the falsity of liberalism was recognized, and it was occasionally subjected to harsh criticism in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, while socialist movements harshly criticized liberalism, their actions were quite different. In most cases, their words and deeds were contradictory! The reason is not hard to find. These movements boldly claimed to speak for all humanity, but their social base was actually only a small portion of the world's population—the less affluent segment of the "modern" group formed in the world economy system between 1750 and 1950. This group included skilled and semi-skilled urban workers, intellectuals worldwide, and talented, educated people in rural areas (where the characteristics of the capitalist world economy system were most evident). While numerous, they did not constitute the majority of the world's population. The old left was a global movement supported by a minority—strong, oppressed, but a minority in the world population. This numerical reality limited the movement's political choices. In this situation, the movement could only do one thing: promote the rapid realization of a reasonable liberal reformist agenda, and it succeeded quite well. This brought tangible benefits to the leaders, though not necessarily significant ones. However, as the participants in the 1968 revolution declared, many people were no longer enjoying equal treatment. The old left spoke a language of universal salvation but implemented exclusionary policies. The reason the ideological veil of false universalism was torn away in 1968 and 1989 was the fundamental change in social reality. The capitalist world economy system has consistently acted according to the logic of continuous capital accumulation, relentlessly pursuing its ideal of changing everything. This is reflected in many new social realities: the spread of mechanization in production, the removal of spatial limits on commodity exchange and information flow, the global de-ruralization, the near-destruction of ecosystems, the significant monetization of work processes, and consumerism (i.e., high consumption). These developments are well-known and have become a subject of global discussion. However, let us consider what these developments mean from the perspective of continuous capital accumulation. First and foremost: these developments mean that the rate of capital accumulation will be severely constrained. The main reason for this is socio-political. There are three major reasons.
The first reason has long been recognized by analysts, though it was only recently fully understood. The global urbanization and the advancement of education and communication have made political mobilization easier and concealing socio-economic disparities and the role of the state in maintaining them more difficult. The loss of legitimacy of authoritarian regimes has further heightened political awareness. In short, more people now demand equal compensation and refuse to tolerate the state of capital accumulation—where labor wages are low—any longer. This is reflected in the significant rise in wage levels worldwide and in the growing demand for governments to redistribute basic welfare benefits (especially in healthcare and education) to ensure stable incomes.
The second reason is that governments provide subsidies for infrastructure development while allowing businesses to externalize costs, greatly increasing their own burden. The externalization of costs by businesses is what journalists call the ecological crisis, the crisis of rising healthcare costs, the crisis of high costs for big science, and so on. Governments find it difficult to continue subsidizing private enterprises while also increasing welfare benefits for citizens. Either private enterprises or citizens must significantly reduce their demands. For the more alert citizens, this unavoidable class struggle could be extremely brutal.
The third reason is that political awareness is now global. Differences at both the global and national levels are reflected in ethnic, racial, and religious allocations. Therefore, the consequences of the combination of political awareness and national fiscal crises will be a large-scale struggle, in the form of civil war, at both the global and national levels. The pressures faced by the current world system will first threaten the rationality of state institutions and thus their ability to maintain order. Once state institutions lose this ability, they will inevitably pay an economic and security price, which will further exacerbate the pressures and thus further threaten the rationality of state institutions. This is not a future matter; this is a present matter. We have noticed that insecurity has greatly increased—in concerns about crime, random violence, the inability of the judicial system to ensure fairness, and police brutality. This insecurity has multiplied many times over in the past 10–15 years. I am not saying that these phenomena are new or that they are much more severe than before. However, the majority of people believe that these phenomena are new, more severe than before, and much more severe. The serious consequences of this perception are the loss of authority of state institutions. This escalating, self-reinforcing state of disorder cannot last forever, but it can persist for 25–50 years. This state of disorder is a chaotic condition of the current world system; it has formed because the safety valves of the system have failed; in other words, the contradictions of the system itself have intensified to the point where none of the mechanisms used to restore its normal function can operate effectively. Moving out of this chaos, a new order is in sight. This brings us to the final question: the choices we face—the choices we must make now.