Tripartite Review -- A Priori Critique

Author: Liu Shilin
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2001-05-01
Features: Since the 1990s, the rampant plagiarism and, the arbitrary behavior of academic cliques in various contexts, and the institutionalization and powerization of academia itself—these "experiences" that directly affect the fate of Chinese academia—should not be the primary targets of contemporary academic criticism? Unlike the common attribution of these issues to the external environment of academic production, I interpret them from the context of transcendental critique as "due to being accustomed to rough mental labor and never having clarified the distinction between mental labor and material production in the realm of ideas." In other words, precisely because people face significant cognitive difficulties in understanding the purity of academia, the various speculations and scandals in the contemporary academic world continue to emerge. There are two main reasons for this: First, although the modern demand for academic independence emerged in Chinese academia in the early 20th century, and some scholars considered academic independence a fundamental marker of the establishment of modern Chinese academia, the actual situation is the opposite of this rational form of academia. The vast majority of Chinese scholars have become accustomed to depending on external environments and pressures; in most cases, they are completely unaware of what true academia is and merely view it as a tool for acquiring livelihood resources. This has created the necessary "material conditions" for transcendental critique targeting pure concepts or subjective consciousness. Second, although some people may occasionally express profound or superficial "confessions" or lamentations about the decline of scholarly refinement, on the one hand, due to the severe desire-driven state of academic subjects, these expressions are mostly mere "instinctive reactions" triggered by gains and losses in practical interests. On the other hand, due to the excessive fragility of their rational reflection awareness and abilities, they cannot actually delve deeply into such reflection and critique. As a result, the pure academic consciousness and efforts that occasionally spark in the midst of historicalities are quickly devoured by various empirical calculations and utilitarian considerations, making the conceptual and ideological differences between academia and non-academia increasingly ambiguous.
In Transcendental Critique, the author's main understanding of transcendental critique has three layers: From a philosophical perspective, it is a transcendental critique of the cognitive schemata used to organize perceptual materials; from a linguistic perspective, it is a narratological analysis of the deep grammatical structures that determine discourse encoding and meaning generation; and from the perspective of the mode of spiritual production, it is a critical examination of the internal production concepts of producers that already exist before the reproduction of spiritual production. Among these three layers of interpretation of the transcendental critique concept, the first layer originates from Kant and is also something that has always been widely recognized. The other two interpretations are further developments within the modern academic perspective. This development is certainly not "wild speculation," but rather because there is a family resemblance between "transcendental forms," "deep grammatical structures," and "internal production concepts." As some scholars have pointed out, Transcendental Critique is indeed filled with Kantian influences, and in terms of foundational theory, it does not offer much to celebrate in terms of innovation. If one must discuss the significance of the topic of Transcendental Critique, then in my opinion, it lies in its certain degree of clarification and limitation of empiricism, particularly in the "critical reduction" of the misinterpretations and distortions of transcendental philosophy by empiricism or rational dogmatism, and in its clear affirmation of the important significance of transcendental critique for academic culture that represents the essence of human rationality.
It is clear that to delve deeper into the work of transcendental critique, relying solely on the classical spiritual resources of Kant is certainly not enough. It can also be frankly admitted that due to the principle of "specialization in one's field" and inadequate preparation for modern transcendental philosophy theories—such as phenomenology—myself is not the most suitable person to discuss the topic of transcendental critique. In terms of the overall level of Chinese academic thinking, I believe that it is already sufficient to honestly accept some enlightenment from Kantian philosophy, to understand that there is a pure reason different from practical functions in life, and especially to recognize its important significance for a dignified spiritual life.
Transcendental Critique has not absorbed the new achievements of phenomenology in consciousness analysis, which is undeniable. However, on the other hand, this is also because the basic direction of transcendental critique established by Kant has not undergone a fundamental reversal in phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty said, "Phenomenology is transcendental philosophy." Therefore, from a broader perspective, they are consistent in terms of approach and goals. It can also be said that there is no subversive deconstruction or fundamental transformation between transcendental philosophy and phenomenology, but rather that in modern phenomenological philosophy, Kant's analysis of the structure of self-consciousness has been made more detailed. For example, such issues as Husserl's particular focus on "the correspondence between conscious acts and objects" and "the construction of objects in consciousness" are all the case.