Information Efficiency and Mechanism Housing Mortgage Loan Market Research

Author: Wang Chongrun
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-12-01
Features: Chapter 1 serves as the introduction to this book. This book studies the impact of information asymmetry on the design of housing mortgage contracts, as well as the role of government intervention mechanisms and information separation systems. In China's housing mortgage market, there is severe information asymmetry, and banks often find it difficult to fully understand the creditworthiness of loan applicants. Chapter 2 examines how lenders can use contract design to achieve the goals of screening borrowers and improving information asymmetry under conditions of information asymmetry. Chapter 3 assumes that borrowers are in a leading position in the game relationship and constructs a signaling model to analyze the role of housing savings deposits linked to loans. Chapter 4 analyzes the moral hazard in mortgage loans. This chapter also examines the moral hazard in housing accumulation fund loans. Information asymmetry and moral hazard damage the efficiency of the mortgage market. Although the spontaneous actions of economic entities can mitigate this harm, the extent of the mitigation is limited. To further improve market efficiency, non-market mechanisms such as government intervention and information separation systems must be introduced. This is the issue addressed in Chapter 5. In addition to government intervention and establishing information separation systems among banks, introducing third-party insurance can also effectively eliminate the harm caused by information asymmetry to the mortgage loan market. This is the issue addressed in Chapter 6. Based on the theoretical analysis in the previous chapters, Chapter 7 discusses how to develop China's housing mortgage loan market from the perspective of reducing information asymmetry. Feasible strategic choices include innovating mortgage loan instruments.