Contract and Organization Case Studies

Author: Edited by Masten / Chen Hawei / Li Qiang
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-06-01
Features: "Contract and Organization Case Studies" is a collection of representative empirical literature in the field of transaction cost economics, with a focus on contracts and organizations. Transaction cost economics originated from Coase's insights, for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991. Subsequently, Williamson's research significantly advanced the development of transaction cost economics. Today, this discipline studies fundamental organizational issues, such as the role of reputation, the purpose and limitations of contracts, the nature and boundaries of the firm, and the evolution and function of "hybrid" organizational forms, including franchising, leasing, joint ventures, and others. The industries covered in this book include the aerospace industry, the automotive industry, the power generation industry, the fast-food industry, the natural gas industry, ocean transportation, petroleum coke refining, rail transportation, soft drink sales, the shoe manufacturing industry, and the tuna processing industry, among others. Chapter 1 provides a concise overview of the logic and analytical approach of transaction cost economics and summarizes the role of each case in understanding economic organization. The selected articles have been slightly processed, with a relatively reduced technical tone, making the book accessible to students in business schools and law schools, as well as advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics. The "Contract and Organization Case Studies" presented to you is a collection of 13 classic empirical papers in the field of transaction cost economics. Most of the 13 papers are from top economics and law journals. It can be said that the theoretical foundation of transaction cost economics is built upon empirical literature such as these, and the selected papers in this book successfully demonstrate the application of Williamson's ideas across different industries, further enriching the field of transaction cost economics. The content of this book is divided into three parts. Part 1 consists of 6 articles that explore the role of contracts in governing transactions and discuss the factors influencing contract design and duration. The second part includes 3 articles that examine alternative market transactions to vertical integration, attempting to identify the conditions that would lead traders to abandon contracts in favor of internal organizational arrangements. The third part features 4 articles that study intermediate types or "hybrid" organizational forms that combine both contractual and internal organizational characteristics, such as franchising and leasing.