Silver and copper coins of the prefectural and county officials: Rationalizing financial reforms in 18th century China

Author: (USA) Zeng Xiaoping / Dong Jianzhong
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-01-01
Features: Zeng Xiaoping's important work, challenging us to rethink our overall interpretation of the Yongzheng era and 18th-century China. It provides a new and effective analytical framework. — Professor R. Kent Guy, Washington State University, USA
This is the best research on institutions based on archives so far in the field of Chinese studies. It will set the standard for a generation of researchers — this is an outstanding achievement. — Professor Philip A. Kuhn, Harvard University, USA
With a keen sense and clear mind, Zeng Xiaoping boldly and successfully addresses one of the most fundamental questions in Chinese history: the imperial fiscal system. — Professor Susan Naquin, Princeton University, USA
Recently, all modern Chinese history courses in the United States have begun with the Opium War's sound of gunfire. For Chinese scholars, 1840 has also become the dividing line between ancient and modern history. By focusing solely on China's failures in responding to Western imperialism, the internal evolutionary process of China itself has become blurred. Recent research on population growth, commercialization, handicraft development, and agricultural specialization has completely shattered the notion of a static late imperial economy. However, in the political sphere, the specter of corruption in the Qing Empire lingers in the minds of 19th-century historians, unforgettable to this day. Although we no longer speak of an "unchanging China," the paradigm for understanding early modern Chinese experience remains weak. The corrupt empire, due to its outdated ideological traditions, lagged behind reforms. As a result, we often overlook the complexity of this process and fail to explore the true roots of China's decline in the 19th and 20th centuries. This book discusses China before the "Western arrival." It also addresses corruption, but more importantly, it focuses on the issue of change. The first century of Manchu rule was not only a page in history where barbarians accepted Chinese governance but also a vibrant period of reform with significant implications for China's potential to develop into a strong, modern nation. The main focus of early Qing reforms was fiscal policy. Building on China's existing bureaucratic foundations, the new Manchu dynasty vigorously pursued fiscal reforms to strengthen autocratic rule and enhance the institutional construction of the centralized government. They separated the emperor's private treasury from the state treasury, reflecting the clear division between the inner court and the outer court. To strengthen the direct connection between subjects and rulers, Qing rulers weakened the power of scholars and local strongmen, who had previously played a mediating role but diluted the authority of state governance. To increase tax revenue, the Qing simplified tax assessment, merging land tax and head tax. Meanwhile, the Qing government clearly distinguished taxes belonging to local and central governments. They established a system of financial audits to monitor the collection and use of revenue, ensuring that the central government supervised all state income. In summary, these measures constituted a significant part of the evolution of China's administrative institutions. However, they could not withstand the inherent weakness of the late imperial fiscal system. Corruption and tax evasion had long threatened the stability of the early Qing state's finances. Rulers in 17th- and 18th-century China faced the same problems as European monarchs of the same era: a weak agricultural fiscal foundation; blurred boundaries between personal and state income; and fierce competition for limited surplus products both within and outside the bureaucracy. China had a mature bureaucracy, and the reforms initiated by the founders of the Manchu dynasty demanded that local fiscal administrators be diligent but failed to provide them with sufficient funds, exacerbating the difficulties of solving these issues. The great achievement of early 18th-century Chinese reformers lay in creating a fiscal system that not only met the needs of traditional political economy but also had the potential to develop into a system suitable for a strong centralized state. The pinnacle of early Qing fiscal reforms was the "recovery of consumption fees to the state," implemented during the reign of the third emperor, Emperor Yongzheng. Officials in each province were authorized to levy a certain proportion of additional fees (known as "fire consumption") on all land and head taxes sent to the central government. These fees were retained locally as officials' "retirement allowances" and "public expenses." The retirement allowances significantly increased officials' salaries, while public expenses enabled them to undertake certain administrative responsibilities and implement beneficial local projects. Although the concept of recovering consumption fees was simple, its impact on China's fiscal management structure was enormous. Within the bureaucracy, it provided local officials with sufficient funds, eliminating institutionalized government corruption. With a reliable source of public expenditure, officials could budget for local spending and focus on long-term planning for local construction projects. Moreover, with guaranteed revenue, local governments could take on many services and public affairs as their responsibilities, which had been neglected or assigned to private individuals in decades of imperial rule. Many of the problems the new fiscal system sought to address were leftovers from the previous dynasty. The Ming dynasty had also made efforts to eliminate corruption, but apart from the reforms of the "Single Whip Law," it had little success in rebuilding the national fiscal mechanism. The monetization of taxes, a key goal of the Single Whip Law, was a major factor contributing to the crisis of early Qing reforms. However, the differences between the two dynasties in government operations largely explain why the Qing dynasty was capable of such radical reforms in fiscal institutions. Although the bureaucratic structures of the Ming and Qing dynasties were similar, ideological appeals played a far more significant role in official evaluations and decision-making during the Ming. More importantly, the status of the emperors in the two dynasties was a key factor. The Ming dynasty is famous for abolishing the prime minister, a move widely seen as a fatal blow to the rise of autonomy in the late imperial period. Nevertheless, most late Ming rulers were little more than puppets in the hands of the literati who controlled the central bureaucracy. On the other hand, as outsiders, the early Qing rulers were rarely bound by traditional protocols of imperial-subject relations and brought new concepts of imperial authority to China. Compared to the centralized authority emphasized by traditional Confucian ideals, in practice, they placed the emperor in a position of even greater concentration of power. In the policy-making process, the early Qing emperors played a direct role in introducing new ideas and methods of governance. By the early 18th century, this role was reinforced by the creation of new institutions, such as the system of memorial memorials, which provided the emperor with information and strengthened his control over administrative affairs. Compared to the Ming dynasty, the Qing bureaucracy itself was more centralized, which facilitated nationwide reforms and ensured the emperor's guidance over them. These conditions made it possible to adopt reasonable measures to address China's fiscal crisis in the 1820s and 1930s, but they could not guarantee the successful implementation of such bold measures. Each emperor during the so-called High Qing period was a capable and diligent ruler. However, the differences in their personalities and the political climate during their reigns profoundly influenced their approach to fiscal affairs. The last ruler of the High Qing, Emperor Qianlong, sought a balance between the overly lenient rule of his grandfather, Emperor Kangxi, and the overly harsh rule of his father, Emperor Yongzheng. Leniency and harshness were not just the different styles of these two great emperors. During Emperor Kangxi's reign, the Manchus had not yet established true rule. It is well known that he refused to crack down on corruption, but this may have been due to the need to appease the dominant Han officials who had not yet fully submitted to Qing rule. His son, Emperor Yongzheng, no longer feared criticism from officials or scholars. By the time he ascended the throne, China was unified, and peace reigned. For the elite, nearly eighty years of Manchu rule had made them loyal only to the Qing court. Their status depended not only on local wealth and influence but also on imperial appointments and honors. Emperor Yongzheng was stern and pragmatic. However, had he ruled earlier, it is unlikely he would have adopted the rational management and measures to combat corruption and scholar privileges that he actually implemented. Part of the peace and prosperity of the High Qing period can be attributed to the reforms of recovering consumption fees. Unfortunately, despite its contributions to the early modernization of China, the recovery of consumption fees ultimately failed. 19th-century China was indeed a corrupt and fragmented nation, with a declining government unable to resist internal and external threats. Nevertheless, when we truly understand that the "traditional" Chinese imperial system seemed unchanging in the face of the rise of the West in the 19th century, the essence of Chinese modern history we seek will undergo a dramatic change: China was not always like this. We must learn to view late imperial China as a vibrant nation, striving to develop its own unique and efficient bureaucratic institutions. Even if the recovery of consumption fees was a failed reform, we must ask why. In the 19th century, Chinese intellectuals attributed the root of bureaucratic corruption to the moral decline of the Chinese bureaucracy. Modern critics often follow this conclusion, arguing that the Qing government was too weak and lazy to implement the severe punishments for fiscal misconduct it had established, or that entrenched interests were too powerful, no matter who sat on the emperor's throne. Ultimately, we arrive at an unsatisfactory explanation: because China was corrupt, China was corrupt. Such an explanation is not an explanation; it does not provide us with a basic method for judging the actual situation of late imperial China. More importantly, it neither provides us with materials nor an analytical framework for comparing Chinese dynasties with other pre-modernized societies, or with the problems faced by the Chinese government in the 20th century. Indeed, individual factors did play a role in the failure of the recovery of consumption fees, just as they did in its implementation. Emperor Qianlong, compared to his predecessors, received more Confucian education and was deeply devoted to the myth of Confucian imperial authority. Harald Kahn gave a brilliant analysis of how Confucian imperial thought shaped Emperor Qianlong's behavior. Two striking examples are his excessive emphasis on filial piety toward his mother and his almost obsessive desire to be a patron of art and literature. His desire to be seen as a benevolent and righteous ruler made him hesitant in dealing with Yongzheng's reforms. On one hand, he feared that supporting the recovery of consumption fees would be seen as contradicting the behavior of ancient sages. On the other hand, he was also unwilling to completely reject the policies his father had painstakingly implemented. Ultimately, Emperor Qianlong's attempt to strike a balance did indeed undermine the recovery of consumption fees, but it cannot be held solely responsible for the institutionalized corruption that reappeared in late Qing times. A more important reason lies in the constraints imposed on rational fiscal management by the socio-economic system of the late imperial period. If we are to correctly understand the decline of the Chinese empire, we must examine the impact of this system on the empire's efforts to eliminate corruption. The gradual decline of the recovery of consumption fees provides an excellent example of the limitations of late imperial reforms. Analyzing this will remind us to pay attention to the methods the government used to assess its task of maintaining sufficient revenue and the means it often employed. If the government did attempt to eliminate corruption but ultimately failed, then studying the reforms can help us better understand how the tensions of late imperial politics led to the decline of China in the 19th and 20th centuries.