Theoretical logistics

Author: George C. Thorp (USA) / Zhang Yan
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-01-01
Features: "Theory of Logistics—The Science of War Preparation" is one of the earliest pioneering works on logistics theory in the West, authored by Marine Corps Colonel George C. Thorp of the United States and published in 1917. It has been highly regarded by scholars in Western military and logistics academia. The 1980 edition of the British Encyclopaedia Britannica described the book as proposing a "tripartite structure of strategy, tactics, and logistics," emphasizing that "logistics naturally serves as the means to provide for war, both in terms of human resources and material resources." It broke the traditional narrow concept of logistics, expanding its meaning to include "all aspects of war finance, shipbuilding, armament production, and other aspects of the war economy." This was considered a significant development in Western logistics theory since the 19th century.
The renowned American logistics scholar Henry Echols, in his book "National Defense Logistics" (1959 edition), called Thorp's work a "well-written pamphlet" and described it as "the first attempt to study the theory and principles of logistics." He noted that until five copies of the book were discovered in the U.S. Naval Academy library in 1945, it had almost or completely gone unnoticed. Several students who read the book found it highly interesting, believing that if Thorp's ideas had been given the attention they deserved, billions or even hundreds of billions of dollars could have been saved in war. Unfortunately, the book is now out of print.
"Theory of Logistics—The Science of War Preparation" consists of twelve chapters, divided into two parts. The first part, comprising eleven chapters, primarily explores the theoretical role and function of logistics in industrial-age warfare, based on the lessons of past wars, particularly the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, the American Civil War, and the Franco-Prussian War. It examines the interrelationships between strategy, tactics, and logistics, the organizational and leadership structures of the military and logistics, as well as war preparation in peacetime and national wartime production readiness and mobilization. The second part focuses on adapting to wartime needs and strengthening training and education for logistics personnel.
Thorp repeatedly argues in the book that logistics, along with strategy and tactics, forms the three branches of war science. Modern warfare requires corresponding logistical support (including the mobilization of a nation's entire resources), and logistical supports the achievement of strategic and tactical objectives, determining the progress and outcome of wars. Advances in science and technology and social production have led to changes in combat methods, the scale of war, and material demands and consumption, thereby expanding the scope of logistics work and further increasing its importance and complexity. In the industrialized era of war, logistics must adopt the organizational structure of commercial departments, scientific economic management methods, and cultivate knowledgeable professionals, emphasizing efficiency, avoiding duplication and waste. For example, he states, "Strategy to war is like the plot to a play, tactics are like the roles actors perform, and logistics is like stage management, props, and all the backstage work that ensures a successful performance." Though often overlooked, logistics is indispensable to a successful outcome. In warfare, "any strategic or tactical problem must be solved from a logistical perspective," and neglecting logistics results in even higher costs. He emphasizes that logistics "should be recognized as a science" and criticizes military leaders who "fail to mention logistics" while discussing war science as being "ignorant of the realities of war and logistics."
In his view, Napoleon's failure in the invasion of Russia stemmed from failing to recognize logistics as a "major independent aspect of warfare" and from poor coordination of logistical efforts, which was also a logistical failure. In contrast, the Union victory in the American Civil War and the Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War were achieved through better logistical organization. He stresses that modern warfare is "vast, involving numerous sectors," and transforming a nation's resources into combat means to ensure war preparation and execution turns the nation into a "militarized society"—where everyone either fights directly or supports the war effort." Economic and logistical factors, as well as national wartime mobilization, increasingly influence the course and outcome of wars.
In war, "belligerent nations compete fiercely in resource mobilization. Only the side that can use its resources most economically—that is, the side that can achieve the greatest effect from its resource expenditure and select the most economical weapons—will win the war." He predicted the outcome of the ongoing World War I: "The side with the best logistical reserves will win the war." He repeatedly explains that "modern warfare has lost its mystique and chivalry and is closely linked to commerce and industrialization, making commercial methods applicable to war." For this reason, he places great emphasis on the organizational structures of the military and logistics, advocating the principle of "centralized control and decentralized execution," precise division of labor, close coordination, and empowering subordinates. He also stresses the need for scientific management of all tasks and the cultivation of qualified personnel through formal education. He argues, "To study theoretical logistics, one must explore how each part of the logistical organization can work effectively, and every part of the organization must be efficient." "Knowledge leads to efficiency," and "basic education is essential for soldiers in complex modern warfare to achieve their highest efficiency."
To effectively utilize human, material, and financial resources, he draws on the experience of commercial departments and modern industrial production, proposing that "joint efforts lead to great savings." Standardization should be implemented for the common weapons and equipment of the land and naval forces (at that time, there was no air force branch), with unified organization for production and supply. In other areas, joint and unified management should also be adopted, such as the consolidation of military uniform production and the merging of hospitals and healthcare institutions.
Though Thorp's logistics theory is nearly seventy years old, and both war and logistics have undergone significant changes, some of the basic viewpoints and historical analyses in the book remain highly valuable, especially for studying the development of logistics theory. It has been fully translated and published for reference.
It should be noted that Thorp was a bourgeois logistics scholar, and many of his views in the book, such as his perspective on war and the role of the masses in warfare, reflect the of the bourgeoisie. Additionally, the book has shortcomings in academic theory, such as a lack of in-depth scientific analysis of the relationships between war and the economy and between war and logistics. Readers are advised to critically examine and evaluate these aspects.
Furthermore, it should be explained that the title of the book "Theory of Logistics—The Science of War Preparation" has been translated in the past as "Pure Logistics—The Science of War Preparation." Considering Thorp's explanation in the preface, "theoretical logistics" (or "pure logistics") refers to the scientific investigation of logistics theory, corresponding to "applied logistics." Therefore, the current translation has been adopted.