What do we really want

Author: Wen Tiejun
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-04-01
Features: Although China has repeatedly pledged to adopt a "sustainable development strategy," until the 21st century, local government officials still identified the goal as the "world factory." Especially after racing to join globalization at any cost, the focus of development shifted even more toward leapfrogging high growth and achieving rapid GDP growth. This means that our country, a populous nation with limited resources, will continue to engage in the self-destructive "drinking poison to quench thirst," which will inevitably lead to greater resource consumption, environmental destruction, and a more severe degree of exploitation by international financial capital. Perhaps all of this is unavoidable—so, do we have any other choices? When most people are eager to follow the Western model of modernization, the author is asking himself: As Chinese people at the turn of the century, what kind of "modernization path" should we choose? What do we really want? Industrialization in China is truly difficult, because millions of people have already paid the price of their lives. True reform for the Chinese is even more challenging, as it is often closely linked to "flesh tearing." However, we must reform. If reform fails, China will inevitably face revolution or turmoil. We all know from personal experience that both revolution and reform are often forced upon us—they are not pre-approved or designed in advance. In nearly a century of Chinese history, there has never been a precedent like Britain's "Glorious Revolution," where the ruling class voluntarily relinquished some power and interests due to the influence of the aristocracy. Moreover, the traditional aristocracy that valued traditional values has long been destroyed in wars and revolutions, and the new aristocracy is still in the chaotic stage of forming itself. Additionally, traditional intellectuals, as "spiritual aristocrats," either "lost their voice" or self-destructed during the two Cultural Revolutions in 1919 and 1966. Those who survived have become shallow and self-preserving in the technical-thinking mindset of the new generation of intellectuals in the industrialization process. Among them, those who still retain some sense of "local culture" are often easily excluded by the mainstream. Moreover, there has never been any fertile ground for true leftists to emerge in China. This is because the scattered laborers under the pressure of absolute labor surplus lack the conditions to oppose capital. As a result, intellectuals have no opportunity to "combine with workers and peasants," unless there is a special situation of external threats, internal crises, national emergencies, and severe mismanagement by the rulers. The new generation of technical intellectuals derived from New China's industrialization is humorously referred to as "learned but lacking thought, knowledgeable but culturally shallow." Most of them are fundamentally similar to the new aristocracy. Moreover, the modern intellectual mainstream, which emphasizes the value of "education leading to officialdom," will actively and desperately align themselves with the rulers (regardless of who they are) unless pushed to the brink. The masses, of course, are not foolish enough to lose their sense of being exploited. But since intellectuals have abandoned their social responsibility, they lack new ideas to guide them. Those with ideas often turn to tradition in search of answers, while the majority without ideas become "criminal-minded lumpen proletariat." The latter is the objective foundation for China's long-term decline in the peak of the fifth "criminal crime surge" since 1989.